In this article, the verification and validation (V&V) of a fault detection and isolation scheme based on sliding mode observer residual evaluators and threshold-based residual analysis of gyro and thruster faults for the Mars EXpress (MEX) satellite is presented. The results were part of a European Space Agency project with the goal of examining the potential applicability of modern model-based FDI techniques for on-board satellite deployment. The V&V campaign, consisting of firstly a set of specified fault simulations and secondly a Monte Carlo campaign, has been performed using an industrial-level functional engineering simulator developed around a high-fidelity model of the MEX satellite operating during the Sun Acquisition Mode (SAM), which includes up to 6 different controller mode changes. The results show the good performance and robustness of the FDI scheme throughout the SAM phase.
Introduction
Fault detection and isolation has increased in importance during the last few decades as the level of autonomy expected in engineering systems and devices has increased. Many different methodologies have been considered and developed ± often arising from the application of concepts originating in the field of control theory. One application area for these developments has been aerospace systems. In satellite systems there is an implicit requirement to operate with minimal sensor and controller hardware. However satellite deployment is expensive and high risk ± once deployed, if a fault occurs there is no recourse, since it is usually prohibitively expensive to XQGHUWDNH D VDWHOOLWH µFDSWXUH ¶ DQG UHSDLU PLVVLRQ 6DWHOOLWH autonomy, therefore invariably requires a Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) scheme to detect malfunctions. The results presented in this paper are part of a European Space Agency (ESA) project with the goal of examining the potential applicability of modern model-based FDI techniques to on-board satellite deployment, in the present case for the Mars Express during the Sun Acquisition Mode phase. The FDI objective is to distinguish between actuator and sensor faults during this phase, but the main objective of the study is to show the applicability of modern model-based FDI techniques to the industrial satellite process. Thus, efforts are made to show the underlying methodology and transparency (including tuning and implementation aspects) of the proposed FDI design process.
Reference Mission, System & Objectives
The selected study case refers to the Mars EXpress (MEX) during the Sun Acquisition Mode (SAM) phase [1, 2]. The model represents classical satellite dynamics with flexible modes. There are no nonlinearities except for the gyroscopic coupling terms and the uncertainties are classically low on the inertias, but relatively high on the flexible mode parameters (frequency, damping). The available on-board sensing suite is composed of an inertial measurement unit (SIRU) and a Sun Acquisition Sensor (SAS) set. The gyro configuration within the SIRU is a 4-axis configuration, while the SAS is redundant and provides Sun direction (2-axis angle information). The actuation system is composed of four tilted thrusters, fully redundant, that provide 3-axis torque capability for the AOCS. Reaction wheels are available on the spacecraft in nominal mode but are not used during the SAM. In any case, momentum is transferred from the wheel to the body at the start of the acquisition due to friction torque. The main objectives of the ESA-ESTEC study are summarized as follows:
x An advanced technique is required that can deal with thrusters and gyro FDI problems in the presence of time varying dynamics, controller mode changes, noise and uncertainties. x The FDI objectives are to detect fault occurrence and discriminate whether it belongs to the thrusters (opened or closed faults) or the gyro sensors (dead, frozen, excessive noise or excessive bias faults).
The final FDI scheme is composed of a residual generation (RG) stage, using SMO filters, and a residual evaluation (RE) stage for the thruster identification and robustness.
The RG stage is composed of two SMO filters designed in a structural manner based on the four sensing channels. The first observer assumes that sensors 1 and 3 are prone to faults whilst 2 and 4 are fault free. The second observer is built on the hypothesis that sensor channels 2 and 4 are prone to faults and the other two not. Figure 2 shows a comparison between the gyro sensing unit signals and the SMO reconstruction signals for 100 random (in terms of parametric and initial condition uncertainty) simulations using an open thruster fault randomly occurring between 50 and 300 seconds in thruster 2. Note that the SMO signals are able to maximize the fault effects (see for example the top plots where a steptype response is clearly observed on the right). The RE stage analyzes the residuals from the two SMO filters using two components: a thruster fault detection logic and a thruster isolation logic. The logic is composed of constant and time-based thresholds defined using:
i) 100 fault-free random cases to determine the constant fault-free thresholds, above which a fault is declared. These thresholds are selected prioritizing the no false alarm objective (through slightly conservative limits).
ii) 25 random cases for each of the four thrusters assuming open and dead faults occur at 100 seconds. This allows specific signatures to be identified that facilitate isolating the faulty thrusters (and the fault nature), see Figure 3 . It was immediately recognized that by looking at ramp changes, the number of peaks and static threshold violations, a relatively simple identification logic could be derived. The main characteristics of the MEX-FES are the following:
x Full coupled rotational (angular rates and attitude quaternions) and translational (inertial position and velocities) dynamics. x Flexible modes due to two solar arrays, coupling the angular momentum, momentum and flexible coordinate equations.
x Orbit perturbations due to the gravity field, solar radiation pressure and a third body (the Sun).
x Attitude perturbations due to the gravity field and solar radiation pressure x The Goddard Mars Model 2B (GMM2B) gravity field model. x Thruster models composed of a thruster management system (TMS), pulse width modulator (PWM) and chemical propulsion subsystem electronic (CPSE) and using misalignment accuracy. x Parametric uncertainties for mass, the center of mass, the inertia matrix, flexible mode frequency/damping and coupling coefficients, and solar array dispersion. x Gyro models characterized by scale factor, angle random walk, rate random walk, angle white noise and rate saturation effects. x Sun Acquisition Sensors (SAS) including eclipse model and alignment errors. 
Verification & Validation Campaign
This section presents the V&V campaign performed to assess the performance and robustness of the developed FDI scheme. First, a verification campaign is performed using the satellite rigid model (i.e. without flexible modes) and injecting gyro and thruster faults. Then, the validation campaign follows where the full satellite model is used and the focus is on thruster faults.
5.1
Verification results: rigid satellite model The verification campaign was performed at the end of the phase 1 of the project and was used to assess the capability of the SMO RG stage to perform the established tasks. The exact verification configuration for the verification campaign which was performed is as follows:
x Random initial angular rates, mass and random inertia x Random initial quaternion (in spherical coordinates with an angle ranging between [0-45] degrees) x No flexible modes The verification testing matrix in Table 1shows the number of runs performed for each gyro and thruster element based on the type of fault tested (and in parenthesis the time at which the fault was injected). Each run is a random case using the above defined parameters and conditions. In reference [6] more detailed (graphical) results are given for the verification campaign. In this paper a subset is presented for completeness in support of the more complete presentation of the validation results given in next section. Figure 5 shows the 25 random runs for a gyro 3 lock-in-place (LIP) fault occurring at 60 sec. Channel 1 (top-left) shows the least activity while channel 3 (top-right) is very active. This indicates that a fault exists in channel 3. Observer 2 also shows activity in both channels (compared to channel 1) and therefore it can be said that no fault exists in channel 2 or 4. Note that the results from the verification tests do not include the detection logic described in Section 2 (i.e. the residual evaluation component). The thresholds seen in the figures have been placed from post-processing of the data in order to provide a rough guide for the selection of the RE thresholds. Table 2 summarizes the verification results. For sensor faults, in whichever observer (I or II) when the hypothesis is satisfied, one reconstruction signal is always zero (the faultfree channel) and the other nonzero (the faulty one). In the other observer both reconstruction signals react to the faults. For thruster faults this signature does not hold. Thus, the results show that a careful choice of threshold for the gyro fault reconstruction signals is required in order to avoid false and missed alarms but that isolation can then be easily achieved. For the thruster faults, it is clear that a pairbased (thruster 1 or 3 vs. 2 or 4) isolation logic can be easily extracted but that a more sophisticated logic will be required to completely isolate thrusters. With the above configuration, an array of 1200 random configurations (all based on the same seed) is generated. These configurations are then simulated in batch mode first for the fault-free scenario and then for the selected thruster fault scenarios. All the fault scenarios assume that the fault occurs randomly within the indicated occurrence time interval. For each simulation, a mission time of 2000 seconds is used taking around 10 minutes of computer time per simulation using a 3.00 GHz dual-core Intel CPU. These quantities are then used in the fault MC campaign to identify those cases where the introduction of a fault did not have any significant (performance) divergence ±which then allows discounting these fault cases as negligible for evaluation of the MEX FDI system: ‡ Critical fault cases: those where the fuel consumption required to achieve the SAM is 50% higher than the 3-sigma of the fault-free fuel consumption. ‡ Negligible fault cases: those where the introduction of a fault has no significant (performance) divergence with respect to the fault-free simulations ±i.e. those cases where the fuel consumption is within the 3-sigma of the fault-free fuel consumption. Out of 1200 simulations (300 per each of the four thrusters) only 1 simulation resulted in a false alarm, yielding a very favourable false alarm rate of 0.08% ±which can be improved by trade-off with respect to the detection rate performance for the fault cases. Figure 6 and Figure 7 show respectively the MEX-SAM phases, angular rates and the gyro sensors versus SMO filter signals for the 300 runs corresponding to the Thruster 2 faultfree simulations. The manoeuvre is completed when phase 6 is achieved ±notice the spread of time-to-complete is due to the uncertainties considered. Also, notice the effect of the uncertainties on the SMO filter signals (larger than on the gyro-sensor signals) which results in an increased fault detection threshold, but will result in better isolation properties (as will be seen subsequently). In order to demonstrate the advantage of using a SMO filter as opposed to the gyro signals prior to the residual evaluation, observe in bottom-left of Figure 9 that the gyro sensing signals saturate when the angular rates are too high, which limits the usability of these signals for fault isolation. Clearly, see bottom-right of Figure 9 , this is not the case for the SMO FDI scheme as it uses both the gyro signals and the controller commands as inputs to the SMO FDI filters. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the SMO signals magnify the fault effects in some channels and minimize them in others (for a Thruster 2 open fault, the effects on channels 1 and 3 are magnified and those in channels 2 and 4 minimized). The performance of the SMO FDI scheme can be visually analyzed in Figure 10 , which shows the full-isolation time ( th1 ID , th2 ID , th3 ID and th4 ID ) , the by-pair isolation time (th13 ID and th24 ID DQG WKH IDXOW µRFFXUUHQFH ¶ DQG µGHWHFWLRQ ¶ times. First, note that the detection is relatively fast for this W\SH RI IDXOW DQG WKUXVWHU H J WKH FRQFHQWUDWLRQ RI µGHWHFWLRQ ¶ times is in a region similar to the fault µRFFXUUHQFH ¶ WLPHV Next, it is easy to observe that the pair-isolation time (in this case th24 ID WDNHV VOLJKWO\ ORQJHU WKDQ µGHWHFWLRQ ¶ Eut shorter than full-isolation (th2 ID ). Table 3 shows the final FDI performance (detected, isolatedpair and isolated-full percentages).
Observe that for open faults the results indicate close to 100% detection and isolation rates. With respect to the closed faults, the percentage is between 82% and 97% for detection and very similar for isolation, with thruster 3 having a noticeable 18% missed rate. Analysis of the SMO FDI signals for this channel and fault indicated that improved GHWHFWLRQV QRWLFH WKDW ZH DUH µPLVVLQJ ¶ WKH GHWHFWLRQ DQG QRW wrongly identifying it) could be easily achieved through tuning. Indeed, it was observed that for the closed thruster fault, the controller and thruster system configuration was especially robust resulting in an especially challenging fault scenario. Additionally, recall that negligible cases are defined as those within a 3-sigma of the fault-free averages but this is a conservative bound as there are several fault-free cases surpassing this level. 7.
